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ABSTRACT
DYNAMICS OF CIVIL WAR UNDER THE THREAT OF
THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION
Enes S¸afak
Economics , Master of Arts Thesis, 2014
Thesis Supervisor: Özgür K¬br¬s
Keywords: Third-party intervention, humanitarian intervention, civil war, moral
hazard, game theory
The legitimacy of a third-party intervention into a civil conict derives from
the recent re-conceptualization of state sovereignty. However, practical implications
of third-party intervention still need to be studied. This thesis focuses on moral
hazardas one of the most signicant practical implication of the third-party inter-
vention. Moral hazard occurs when a rebel group perceives the intervention as an
insurance and escalates the violence within the conict in order to get international
attraction and external intervention so that it ends up being successful.
The aim of this thesis is to examine how the dynamics of a civil conict between
a government and region elite, who demands a higher share from the resources
in dispute and start a rebellion, changes when there is a third-party who could
intervene in behalf of the region elite if the government uses brutal violence in order
to suppress rebellion, by using a three-player extensive game model. The unique
equilibrium derived from the model suggests, along with some other implications,
ability of the region elite to manipulate the government in order to change the level
of violence within the conict. By that ability, the model indicates, humanitarian
intervention is open to possibility of moral hazard since the region elite can escalate
the violence in order to attract intervention whenever the expected payo¤ from the
intervention is high enough.
ÖZET
ÜÇÜNCÜ TARAF MÜDAHELES·I TEHD·ID·INDE ·IÇ SAVAS¸
D·INAM·IKLER·I
Enes S¸afak
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Özgür K¬br¬s
Keywords: Üçüncü taraf müdahelesi, insani müdahele, iç savas¸, ahlaki tehlike,
oyun teorisi
Bir iç savas¸a yap¬lan üçüncü taraf müdahelesi, mes¸ruitiyetini egemenli¼gin yeniden
tan¬mlanmas¬ndan almakta. Yine de üçüncü taraf müdahelesinin pratik etkileri
çal¬¸smaya aç¬k. Bu tez, üçüncü taraf müdahelesinin en önemli etkilerinden biri olan
ahlaki tehlikeüzerine odaklan¬yor. Ahlaki tehlikeisyanc¬bir grubun müdaheleyi
bir sigorta olarak alg¬layarak, uluslararas¬ düzeyde dikkat çekip d¬¸s müdahelenin
yard¬m¬yla bas¸ar¬l¬olmak için çat¬¸smadaki s¸iddet seviyesini art¬rmas¬durumunda
gerçekles¸ir.
Bu tezin amac¬üç oyunculu bir dinamik oyun modeli kullanarak, bir hükümet
ve söz konusu kaynaktan daha fazla pay isteyerek isyan ç¬karan bölgesel bir elit
aras¬ndaki iç savas¸ dinamiklerinin, hükümetin kulland¬¼g¬s¸iddet seviyesini art¬rmas¬
durumunda müdahele ederek bölgesel elitin yan¬nda yer alacak bir üçüncü taraf¬n
varl¬¼g¬ndan nas¬l etkilenece¼gini incelemek. Modelden elde edilen es¸siz denge, bas¸ka
bir tak¬m önermelerle birlikte, bölgesel elitin çat¬¸sam¬n¬n s¸iddetini art¬rmak için
hükümeti manipule edebilme yetene¼gi oldu¼gunu gösteriyor. Bu yetenek bölgesel
elitin müdaheleden beklenen kar¸s¬l¬k yeterince yüksek oldu¼gunda çat¬¸sman¬n s¸idde-
tini art¬rarak ahlaki tehlikeyaratabilece¼gini gösteriyor.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is examining the dynamics of a civil conict between a
government and a rebellious group over the share of a certain resource when there
is a possibility of third-party intervention. In the model, government implements a
certain level of violence in order to suppress the rebellion; however, higher levels of
violence can create international attraction to the conict and cause an intervention
for humanitarian purposes. The threat of intervention is aimed to keep the level of
violence below some level and if the government fails to respect this level intervention
punishes the government and compensates the loss of the rebellious group. In that
regard, the aim of the intervention is not changing the share in the behalf of the
third-party but to protect populations from brutal violence implemented by the
government. The study examines the behavior of the government and the rebellious
group against the possibility of such intervention.
The end of the Cold War establishes an environment in which armed violence
occur more often within states while bipolar international system did not allow for
such tensions since they have the chance to spread out and threaten the system. A
strict structure was imposed to states belonging to the developing world during the
Cold War and internal issues within these states were suppressed so that the great
powers did not have to deal with conicts belonging to their allies. The end of this
structure encouraged the rebellious groups all over the world, demanding higher po-
litical and scal benets as well as a desire to have more authority on the functioning
of a certain region or the whole country. Meantime, the international community
embraced the idea of human rights and its universality which encouraged United
Nations or certain international coalitions in some cases to intervene into civil wars
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in the name of humanitarian purposes. However, whether the external intervention
to armed violence within a state can be justied by humanitarian concerns or it is
a violation of state sovereignty raised some disagreements.
The external intervention was controversial in all cases whether it is implemented
or not. In Rwanda, the international community did not take required actions in
order to prevent ethnic crimes and was criticized for the unwillingness even if the
intervention is realized after the brutal violence is already happened. In Kosovo, on
the other hand, the intervention of NATO against the Serbian forces raised questions
about the legitimacy of such an intervention and the boundaries of state sovereignty.
In Bosnia, the intervention of the United Nations failed to protect civilians and large
number of people were killed during the peace missions. The intervention decision
must be evaluated in a case by case nature, however certain measures related with
the legitimacy of the intervention was required to be determined.
In 2001, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], 2001)
published a report on humanitarian intervention called "Responsibility to Protect"
in order to prepare a justied base for actions in the name of humanitarian purposes
(ICISS, 2001). The report starts with the idea that the sovereignty of a state in-
side its territories does not mean complete control without any accountability but it
implies some responsibilities on the state structure as a requirement for the respect
and non-intervention into its sovereignty. According to the basic principles of the
report, the primary responsibility of the state as a sovereign entity is the protection
of its people and their rights and if a state fails to protect its people "as a result
of internal war, insurgency repression or state failure, and the state in question is
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to
the international responsibility to protect." (p. XI). The prominent part of this
responsibility is the prevention of such instances by the international community
before any action that can be regarded as intervention. Even when the interven-
tion becomes a necessary action, the international community should consider less
coercive measures rst. In the report, the military intervention is justied in two
cases: large scale loss of life and large scale ethnic cleansing. The loss of life does not
necessarily include genocidal intent, but it has to be as an act of state or failure of a
state institution to protect its citizens. The ethnic cleansing can be carried out by
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. If these circumstances are realized
or there is a strong suspect of realizing, the international community should take
the responsibility to protect and intervene into the situation.
The UN embraced the idea of the responsibility to protect in 2005 World Summit
with the votes from General Assembly. The 138th and 139th articles of the resolu-
tion A/RES/60/1 states "the responsibility to protect populations from genocide,
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war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (p. 30). The resolution
acknowledges the responsibility of each state to protect its citizens from such crimes
and responsibility of the international community to encourage and help states in
this way. If this responsibility is failed to be satised, then the international com-
munity, through the United Nations and UN Security Council, should be prepared
to take necessary collective actions in a timely and decisive manner until the peace
is established.
The international community and the UN Security Council cannot always agree
on whether the reasons for an intervention are realized or not. Yet, the UN decision
to embrace the idea of responsibility to protect puts forward the required justication
for external intervention into the civil wars. However, the practical issues about
the external intervention are still questionable. In most cases, the timing of the
intervention is not enough to prevent crimes against humanity. The decision to
intervene by the UN or authorization of an international coalition with this duty
takes signicant time and debate within international community and most of the
international players approve such an intervention after some serious crime has been
already committed. The intervention is realized after the footage of brutal violence
is published through the media all over the world and international public opinion
demands an end to the conict. Even if the intervention saved people from brutal
violence, whether it can sustain a long-term peace is another question. Another
recently raised question about the humanitarian intervention is related with the
actions of the groups that are su¤ered from the high level of violence. It is argued
that these groups might be encouraged by the possibility of an intervention that will
punish the government and take the risk of brutal violence in order to reach their
political aims if they think that the success is impossible otherwise.
The thesis continues as follows. In Chapter 2 we review the literature about the
extended deterrence theory in which a state can be discouraged to attack another
state if the latter one has a committed defender to protect her in case of war.
Here, the possibility of humanitarian intervention is hoped to deter governments
from committing violence against its people and encourage them to fulll their
responsibility against the people as a sovereign. Next, we the present moral hazard
literature which argues that the humanitarian intervention can increase the violence
as a cause of moral hazard instead of putting a threat in order to limit the level of
violence. Chapter 3 propose a three-player intervention model in order to examine
the changing dynamics of an internal conict when there is a possibility of third-
party intervention with complete information. Chapter 4 solves the same model
with incomplete information over the preference of the third-party. In Chapter 5,
we look at the Kosovo war as a case study to the model and the thesis concludes
with Chapter 6.
3
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1: Extended Deterrence Theory
Extended deterrence theory denes a situation in which a possible attacker re-
linquishes its decision to attack to a possible target since the target has a credible
defender who would intervene into the conict and ght along the target. In this
context, the deterrence of the defender against aggressive behavior to herself is ex-
tended to another party who may lack such a deterrence power in order to discourage
possible attackers (Huth & Russett 1984, Fearon 1994). The essence of the theory
depends on the assumption that the possible attacker would insist in her decision
if there would not be a possible intervener around. The existence of the defender
or possible intervener changes the expected outcome of the possible attacker by de-
creasing the probability of winning the war or increasing war-related costs (Smith
1996). In that way, getting into a war by taking the risk of intervention is not
benecial for the attacker anymore.
Most of the literature examines the credibility of the intervener as essential for
the extended deterrence by arguing that if the intervention threat is not credible, the
attack is inevitable. Therefore, in order to have a bilateral war between the attacker
and the defender, the attacker must calculate the credibility of the intervener correct.
Otherwise, an attack might turn into a multilateral war (Werner 2000). Therefore,
a possible attacker never chooses a target who is believed to have a credible defender
but she turns to targets who cannot benet from the extended-deterrence of a third
4
party. As a result, Fearon (1994) argues, instances of peace is not only dependent
on the existence of non-aggressive actors but it can happen because of deterred
aggressive actors; creating a biased sample over bilateral wars.
The primary focus of the theory was the inuence of the defender on the actions
of the possible attacker by changing the expected payo¤ she can get as a result of an
aggressive behavior. However, the inuence does not happen only in one direction
according to Werner (2000). She argues that the action of the attacker can also
inuence the decision of the possible intervener. She denes a two-player model
in which an attacker makes a demand and opens a war to a target state and the
defender decides whether to intervene or not into the conict. The model assumes
that the defender is hurt from a loss to the attacker as much as the target. Therefore
the stakes of war directly a¤ects the well-being of the defender and it takes the stakes
of war -the demand from the attacker- into calculation while giving the intervention
decision. When the attacker chooses stakes of war low enough for the third-party to
bear war costs, then the attacker can avoid intervention and the war stays bilateral.
Therefore, she argues that the decision of intervention does not depend only on
exogenous factors like the war cost or the inuence on the probability of winning
but it also depends on the stakes of war. In this way, the attacker can manipulate
the third-party, and vice versa.
In previously mentioned works, including Werners model, the target is assumed
to lack the capability of acting strategically. It has no inuence on the strategic
interaction between the attacker and the defender. In that regard, Yuen (2009) ar-
gues that two-player models are insu¢ cient for explaining the issue. Her three-player
model generates some interesting results in which the target state can manipulate
the attacker and the defender in certain ways.
2.2: Moral Hazard in Humanitarian Intervention
The humanitarian intervention is a widely used concept after the end of the Cold
War. As we discussed in the Introduction, the international community embraced
the idea of "responsibility to protect" in order to protect civilian lives from large scale
death and ethnic cleansing when a sovereign state fails to do so. This idea encourages
the international community to support other states to satisfy the requirements
of sovereignty but also claims a threat to the ones who fail or do not intend to
satisfy this responsibility. In this regard, the idea of "responsibility to protect" can
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be considered as a form of extended-deterrence implemented by the international
community against the states who intend to commit brutal violence against its own
citizens. The possibility of the intervention is hoped to discourage those states to
take criminal actions and lower the level of violence in a possible conict within a
state.
However, the moral hazard literature related with such interventions has gained
recent attention. Kuperman (2008a) argues that the probability of the humanitar-
ian intervention encourages the sub-state actors to rebel to the government whose
retaliation could generate international awareness and some kind of intervention to
the conict which increases the chances of rebel groups to be successful. States on
the other hand take extreme measures in order to end the conict before any in-
tervention is implemented. However, when the intervention occurs, some rebellions
might have success with the help of third-parties and this situation can encourage
other rebel groups to take similar actions in order to increase government violence.
In this scenario, the threat of humanitarian intervention creates a moral hazard
problem and encourages the outbreak of higher levels of violence while the intention
is exactly opposite.
Economic theory admits that moral hazard can arise in almost every assurance
when the insured agent can behave recklessly as a result of decreasing risk of loss. As
Kuperman puts forward, the threat of humanitarian intervention can be considered
as an insurance for the rebellious groups, protecting them from brutal violence or
at least punishing the government as a result of this violence. This insurance can
encourage some rebellious groups to reject the terms o¤ered by the government by
hoping that better terms can be reached by the intervention. In some cases, they
can manipulate the government in a way that increases the level of violence within
the conict so that the humanitarian intervention realizes and compensates the loss
of the rebellions.
A very simple solution to this phenomenon could be abandoning the intervention
whenever the rebels are found guilty of the high level of violence or increasing level
of death-poll. Rowlands & Carment (1998) argues that the international community
cannot choose this option for two reasons. First, it might be unable to distinguish the
responsible actors of violence since it does not hold certain information over the acts
of rebellious groups but has to rely on what is shown to the international world. This
argument is supported by Belloni (2006) as well. He uses the term "CNN e¤ect",
arguing that evidences of brutal violence are distributed to worldwide media in order
to create a public opinion which could force international powers to intervene into
the conict (p. 329). He also quotes from Gberie who says that armed violence pays
if it is calibrated on a carefully choreographed ethnic and racial appeal (as cited
in Belloni, 2006, p. 335). Second, the international community might be unable
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to exclude those who are responsible from the violence from benets even if they
belong to rebel groups. The intervener might stick to the aim of protecting civilian
life no matter who escalates the violence (Rowlands & Carment, 1998).
Some authors, on the other hand, argue that the existence of the intervention
threat does not increase the level of violence within the conict, but changes the
dynamics of a possible settlement. According to Grigorian (2005), as long as the
intervention threat is public, the government should calculate the expected utility
and possible losses in case of intervention and behave accordingly instead of being
manipulated by armed rebellion. He also states that explicit or implicit encourage-
ment of third-party for ethnic radicalization should not be counted as moral hazard
since the concept requires an action from rebellions in contrast to third-party inten-
tion. In that regard, the only intention of the third-party must be cease of violence
or relative punishment in order to have a moral hazard situation. Cetinyan (2002)
proposes a three-player model within this context and argues that the government
and the ethnic group in minority do not necessarily ght with each other. More
importantly, the intervention threat does not have any inuence on the outbreak
of a war or the level of violence. Instead, the existence of such a threat changes
the expected payo¤s of the parties; therefore changes the matters of the settlement.
However, the result of his model depends on complete information in which both
the government and the minority can estimate the decision of the intervener and its
e¤ects on the conict beforehand. Cetinyan argues that the outbreak of violence is
related with information asymmetries and commitment problems. In that sense, the
government might increase the level of violence if it does not hold complete informa-
tion over the rebellious groups and the intervener or believes that the intervention
threat is not credible enough.
Another important reason behind the brutal act of the government in spite of
intervention threat is proposed by Nzelibe (2008), saying that the government might
lack the capability of selective violence. The incompetency of the state in di¤erenti-
ating rebels from the civilian members of the minority might result in a non-selective
and indiscriminative violence against the people as a whole. The government might
nd herself in a situation in which she has to act brutally in order to suppress the
rebellion. Since the other option is refraining from the conict and accepting de-
mands from the rebellious group, the government might take the risk of intervention.
Besides, in that way the government might signal other possible rebellions by not
avoiding the war even though a settlement might be more benecial in the short-run.
The literature above argues that the possibility of intervention increases the
expected payo¤ of rebel groups from the intervention signicantly. As a result,
they manipulate the government and take the risk of extreme violence in order
to attract international awareness and cause a humanitarian intervention. Such
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"suicidal rebellion" (Kuperman, 2008b) might be the only way to be successful with
the help of intervention. Even though this could be true mathematically, how rebel
or minority groups can take the risk of extreme violence or even genocide is still a
question. Nzelibe (2008) argues that the reason behind this inconceivable risk might
be an agency problem between rebel leaders and the people. First, rebel leaders
might be after a personal benet from the intervention in form of international
recognition or post-war authority; or they might believe that human loss is not
an issue in order to be successful. Second, they might avoid punishment from
the government in the arbitrary and chaotic nature of indiscriminative violence
which might create an environment for rebel leaders to escape from government
retaliation while keeping armed rebellion. Lastly, indiscriminative violence against
the minority might encourage the masses to support the rebel leaders since the
brutal violence might create a need for revenge from the government. The leaders
might escalate the violence from the government in order to mobilize the masses
against the government.
Previously mentioned literature assumes that the payo¤ of the intervener and
the target is highly correlated in most cases. This correlation can be considered
necessary in the extended deterrence theory since the interest of the intervener to
the conict comes from its alliance with the target state whose well-being increases
the payo¤ of the intervener as well. In Werner (2000) and Yuen (2009), the benet
target gets from her share of the resources in dispute is equal to the benet of
the intervener/defender gets when the target controls this share. The payo¤s they
end up with di¤er only via costs they must bear during the war. However, using
the same concept for a model related with humanitarian intervention might lead
to misdirection. In Cetinyan (2002), however, third-party has a certain desired
distribution over the resources between the government and the rebellious group
and its payo¤ changes according to degree the result mimic this distribution.
In our study, the third-party looks at the level of violence within the conict
and intervenes only if this level reaches some certain threshold determined by the
intervention cost of the third-party. The third-party gets disutility from the vio-
lence and intervenes at a point in which the level of violence implemented by the
government against rebellious group reaches an unacceptable degree. In that regard,
third-party gets no benet from the distribution of the resources between govern-
ment and rebellious group and has no desire to a¤ect this distribution. The only
purpose of the intervention threat is to prevent violence to reach a brutal level that
creates irrevocable damage against civilians and to punish the government in case
of intervention. Our model indicates that, with the sole purpose of decreasing the
level of violence, intervention threat from the third-party might create moral hazard
situation and indirectly cause an increase in the level of violence.
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CHAPTER 3
THE INTERVENTION MODEL WITH COMPLETE INFORMA-
TION
The game consists of three decision makers, namely the region elite (R), the
government (G), and the potential intervener (I). First (at t = 1), R demands a
change in the status-quo in her favor and declares the demand level, x 2 [0;  x].
If the demand level is zero, it means the region elite does not take the risk of
conict and does not want any change in the status-quo. This demand does not
necessarily mean higher share of territory or independence on certain land. It could
be regarded as more autonomy on the region, higher share from taxes or cultural
demands like education in mother tongue etc. The demand level is assumed to
be bounded above with an arbitrarily high number
 
x which, for example, might
correspond to independence or highest amount of war compensation.
Then, (at t = 2) G decides in which way she responds to the demand of the
R. Since the object of analysis in this study is the political violence between the
government and the region elite (and how the possibility of a third party intervention
shapes it), we interpret the declaration of x as a hostile act on the part of the region
elite and specically focus on environments where the government responds the
regional elites demand x with some sort of opposition. Even though the government
chooses not to respond the demand with violence, it does not necessarily mean that
the government concedes to the demand without any challenge. In that case, the
government engages into the conict by solely political means and there is still a
possibility that the government may still achieve staying in status-quo. At this
node, the government decides on the level of violence a 2 [0; 1]. A higher level of
violence generates a higher probability for the government to win the conict and
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to successfully suppress the rebellion. However, higher levels of violence can cause
global attraction to the issue and result in third-party intervention to the conict.
In the last stage of the game (t = 3), the third-party decides whether to intervene
or not to the conict because of humanitarian reasons, after observing the level of
violence the government uses and the war cost it must bear in a multilateral war.
Formally the third-party decides on dummy a variable  2 f0; 1g, which gets the
value of 1 in case of intervention and 0 otherwise.
The game has three generic outcomes. It could end with status-quo if the region
elite does not issue any demand, it could stay as a bilateral war if the third-party
chooses not to intervene and it could create a multilateral war if the third-party
intervenes.
3.1: Payo¤s
Payo¤s of the region elite and the government depends on the demand level x,
the level of violence a and the intervention decision by the third-party in addition
to the following exogenous parameters. First one is the probability of elite to be
successful in a political conict that does not include any violence p 2 [0; 1]. This
probability is a constant parameter and indicates the probability of elite to get the
demand as a result of a solely political conict in which the government chooses zero
level of violence. Second is the third-party division after intervention xu 2 [0;  x].
The division determines the amount of change from the status-quo in favor of the
region elite once the intervention is realized and it is known by all parties before
the game has started. Considering xu as a personal act of the third-party against
the government might be misleading in real life examples. Rather it should be con-
sidered as the change in status-quo after an intervention is realized. In most cases,
third-party intervention forces both sides to sit on a table and make a settlement
which generally gives more shares to the region elite related to status-quo. In some
other cases, third-party intervention nds government o¢ cials guilty of humanitar-
ian crime and members of the minority group gets empty seats in the bureaucracy.
Even though there is no pre-determined third-party division, previous examples of
humanitarian intervention and their results can be used to determine such para-
meter. Chapter 5 will give a good example of this as the end of the Bosnia War
with Dayton Peace Agreement created the perception of the result of intervention is
settlement table which might end up with independence. Therefore, we continue to
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use term third-party division in order to refer to this situation. The third-party uses
this division as a punishment to the government as a response to brutal violence
against the region elite if the conict ends up with the intervention and expects that
the government is discouraged to use higher levels of violence since it would mean
certain loss for the government. In that sense, higher xu means higher punishment to
the government once the conict ends up with intervention. Last ones are war cost
parameters for region elite and government (r 2 [0; 1] and g 2 [0; 1] respectively).
Both are constant numbers within this range and getting into linear war cost of the
parties.
We assume that the third-party division is higher than the cost parameter of
the region elite, formally xu > r. This assumption is used in order to provide an
environment in which the region elite gets better o¤ than the status-quo in case
of intervention even though the government implements highest possible level of
violence (a = 1). With this assumption we discard cases in which the region elite
gets worse o¤than the status-quo even with the intervention and consider a situation
in which the region elite prefers intervention to the status-quo. This assumption is
consistent with the intention behind the study which examines the behavior of the
region elite and the government when there is an outside option for the elite instead
of a bargaining game only with the government. When this assumption is violated,
the elite might prefer bilateral war to intervention for some instances. However,
such preference does not allow us to examine the e¤ect of third-party intervention
threat completely. Therefore, we maintain this assumption throughout the study
and look for cases in which the region elite prefers intervention to the status-quo.
The probability of region elite to win the conict in case of no intervention is a
function depending on p and decreasing with the level of violence by the government.
Formally,
P (region elite winsjp; a) = p
1 + a
P (government winsjp; a) = 1  p
1 + a
Moreover, both parties must bear the cost of war which is an increasing linear
function of the level of violence depending on the cost parameter of the party. There-
fore, in case of no intervention, the region elite and the government get following
payo¤s
ur(x; a;  = 0) =
p
1 + a
x  ra
ug(x; a;  = 0) =   p
1 + a
x  ga
If the third-party decides to intervene, then both region elite and government
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: Figure 3.1: The Intervention Model with Complete Information
get exogenously determined shares and bear the cost of war. In that case
ur(x; a;  = 1) = xu   ra
ug(x; a;  = 1) =  xu   ga
The third-party gets disutility from the violence if it does not intervene to the
conict. This is represented by the function v(a) which is decreasing with level of
violence and becomes zero when the government chooses a = 0. If the third-party
intervenes to the conict, then it has to bear a constant war cost c 2 R , which is
a negative real number.
ut( = 0jx; a) = v(a)
ut( = 1jx; a) = c
Figure 3.1 represents the extensive form game; actions and expected payo¤s of
the players.
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3.2: Equilibrium
In the literature, main reason behind an intervention is generally seen as informa-
tion asymmetry over the characteristics of the third-party. When the government
does not know the exact level the intervention will be implemented, it might in-
crease the level of violence believing that the intervention is a remote possibility.
Otherwise, some argue, the government can calculate her expected payo¤ from the
intervention and settle an agreement with rebellion without provoking any interven-
tion or keep the level of violence at a lower level and sustain bilateral war. This idea
depends on the underlying assumption that the government always prefers bilateral
war over intervention. By that assumption, the government avoids a level of violence
that will bring intervention for sure. This assumption is violated in our model, if
third-party division is not that hurting for the government. If xu is low enough, the
government might prefer intervention and choose higher levels of violence in order
to suppress region elite more e¤ectively while enduring slight punishment.
In this section we use backward induction in order to solve the game and nd
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the game. In that regard, we put forward
certain conditions that satisfy the underlying assumption about the preference of
the government. When the assumption is satised we expect to nd equilibiria with
non-intervention. We also look at cases in which the assumption is not satised and
check whether there is any SPNE or not.
The violence threshold for the intervention, a, can be found by equating above
payo¤s of the third-party, v(a) = c. The third-party intervenes whenever the
government chooses a higher violence level than the threshold and does not intervene
otherwise. If the level of violence within the conict is equal to a, then the third-
party is indi¤erent between intervening or not. Therefore the government faces
an additional trade-o¤ when deciding on the level of violence. More brutal violence
increases the probability of winning the conict but it can also cause an intervention
in addition to increasing war cost.
At t = 3, the third-party decides whether to intervene or not according to her
war cost and the level of violence chosen by the government. In accordance with the
intervention threshold which satises v(a) = c, the best response function of the
third-party is as follows:
Bt(x; a) =
8><>:
 = 0 if a < a
 = 1 if a > a
 = f0; 1g if a = a
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We solve the game in two subsections; in the rst one, third-party does not in-
tervene when it is indi¤erent and in the second subsection the third-party intervenes
when it is indi¤erent. In both cases, we rst implement the underlying assumption
for government to prefer bilateral war to multilateral war in any circumstances. In
order to satisfy this assumption, we put some constraint over the third-party division
xu, and look for equilibria with this constraint. Then, we disregard the assumption
and check whether there is any other equilibrium or not.
3.2.1: Non-intervention at a
In this case the optimal choices of the government and the region elite can be
calculated for a situation in which the government avoids intervention. At t = 2,
the government must choose a level of violence that does not exceed the threshold
a in order not to generate an intervention. For this range, the government tries to
maximize the following objective function
max
a2[0;a]
  p
1 + a
x  ga
In that case, the optimal choice for the government depending on demand level and
non-intervention is as follows
a(x; 0) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if x 2 [0; g
p
]r
px
g
  1 if x 2 [g
p
;
g
p
(1 + a)2]
a if x 2 [g
p
(1 + a)2;
 
x]
Above choices of the government generates 3 ranges for the region elite, at t = 1.
Range 1 x 2 [0; g
p
]
For a demand level in this range the government chooses a(x; 0) = 0 which
generates the following objective function for the region elite
max
x2[0;
g
p
]
px
The region elite maximizes its expected utility in this range at x =
g
p
= x1. Corre-
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sponding payo¤ from this choice is
ur(x

1; 0; 0) = g
Range 2 x 2 [g
p
;
g
p
(1 + a)2]
For a demand level in this range the government chooses a(x; 0) =
r
px
g
  1
which generates the following objective function for the region elite
max
x2[
g
p
;
g
p
(1+a)2]
p
1 + ag(x; 0)
x  rag(x; 0)
The optimal demand level for the region elite in this range depends on the rela-
tionship between cost parameters of the government and the region elite. If g > r,
then the objective function is an increasing concave function and gets its maximum
value at the end of the range. If g < r, then the objective function is a decreasing
convex function and gets its maximum value at the beginning of the range. If both
parameters are equal to each other, then the region elite gets a constant payo¤ from
any demand level from this range. Formally,
x2 =
8>>>><>>>>:
g
p
if g < r
g
p
(1 + a)2 if g > r
x 2 [g
p
;
g
p
(1 + a)2] if g = r
We let
g
p
= x21 = x

1 and
g
p
(1 + a)2 = x22 for future notation. Expected utilities
from these choices are as follows
ur(x

21; ag(x

21; 0); 0jg < r) = g
ur(x

22; ag(x

22; 0); 0jg > r) = g + (g   r)a
ur(x; ag(x; 0); 0jg = r) = r = g
Range 3 x 2 [g
p
(1 + a)2;
 
x]
For a demand level in this range the government chooses a(x; 0) = a which
generates the following objective function for the region elite
max
x2[
g
p
(1+a)2; x]
p
1 + a
x  ra
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The region elite maximizes its expected utility in this range at x =
 
x. Corresponding
payo¤ from this choice is
ur(
 
x; a; 0) =
p
1 + a
 
x  ra
Next, we will look at optimal choice of the region elite in three conditions for
cost parameters of the government and the region elite.
Condition 1 (g > r)
x =
 
x
Condition 2 (g = r)
x =
 
x if
p
1 + a
 
x  ra > g
x 2 f xg [ [x1; x22] if
p
1 + a
 
x  ra = g
x 2 [x1; x22] if
p
1 + a
 
x  ra < g
Condition 3 (g < r)
x =
 
x if
p
1 + a
 
x  ra > g
x 2 f x; x1g if
p
1 + a
 
x  ra = g
x = x1 if
p
1 + a
 
x  ra < g
Above conditions imply that there are three optimal choices for the region elite
according to the values of exogenous parameters. Following three pairs represent the
optimal choice of the region elite and the government if the latter avoids intervention
in any circumstances
(
 
x; a) (1)
(x;
r
px
g
  1) 8x 2 [x1; x22] (2)
(
g
p
; 0) (3)
We look at the minimum outcomes for the government from these pairs so that
we can put a constraint on xu in order to prevent the government from choosing a
level of violence that generates intervention, i.e.  = 0. For the second row expected
utility of the government depending on x is
 2ppgx+ g
which decreases in the demand level. Therefore, the government gets the minimum
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expected utility if the region elite chooses the maximum demand level in this range.
Followings are the minimum expected utilities the government can get from possible
pairs of optimal choices in case of non-intervention.
ug(
 
x; a) =   p
1 + a
 
x  ga
ug(x

22;
r
px
g
  1) =  g   2ga
ug(x

1; 0) =  g
Now we look at the expected utility of the government in case of intervention
in order to make a comparison between expected payo¤s from intervention and no
intervention cases. The objective function of the government in that case is as
follows
max
a2(a;1]
 xu   ga
Since the expected utility of the government does not depend on the demand level
in this case, she gets higher expected utility as the level of violence gets lower. Since
the third party does not intervene at a, the government chooses a level in the range
(a; 1). In that case the expected value of the government is from intervention can
get following values
ug(x; a; 1) 2 ( xu   g; xu   ga)
The government is never tempted by the intervention if the minimum expected
utility she can get if she avoids the intervention is higher than the maximum expected
utility that can be generated from the intervention. This condition is satised if
 xu   ga  minf  p
1 + a
 
x  ga; g   2gag
which forces the following constraint over the third-party division
xu   maxf  p
1 + a
 
x; g   gag
This condition ensures that there is at least one SPNE in which the third-party
does not intervene to the conict for this case. If the condition is not satised, the
government can deviate from the strategy that brings non-intervention by increasing
the level of violence and cause intervention. However, the government does not have
a best response to the intervention decision of the third-party since she tries to
minimize the level of violence within the set of (a; 1]. Therefore, if the condition is
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not satised, then there is no SPNE in this case.
3.2.2: Intervention at a
A similar methodology is implemented for this case as well. In order to avoid
intervention, the government must choose the level of violence in the set [0; a). The
optimal choice of the government in case of non-intervention is as follows:
a(x;  = 0) =
8<: 0 if x 2 [0; x

1]r
px
g
  1 if x 2 [x1; x22)
If the region elite chooses a demand level x = x22, expected utility of the government
gets its maximum value at a = a, however the government cannot choose this
level in no intervention case since the strategy set is openly bounded above. For
higher demand levels, the government faces with the same issue as well. Therefore,
for demand levels x  x22, there is no equilibrium which includes no intervention
decision by the third-party.
Range 1 x 2 [0; x1]
The rst range generates the same decisions with the rst case in which the
third-party does not intervene when it is indi¤erent. In this range the demand level
that gives highest expected utility to the region elite is x = x1 and
ur(x

1; 0; 0) = g
Range 2 x 2 [x1; x22)
This range also generates similar results with the rst case except when g > r. If
this condition is applied, expected utility of the region elite gets its maximum value
at x = x22, however the elite cannot choose this level since the strategy set is openly
bounded above. Therefore, the optimal choice for the region elite in this range is
x2 =
(
x1 if g < r
x 2 [x1; x22) if g = r
Possible pairs of optimal choices, depending on the values exogenous parameters
get, are as follows if the government avoids intervention in any circumstances:
(x1; 0)
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(x;
r
px
g
  1)8x 2 [x1; x22)
The region elite gets the same expected utility from both pairs but expected
utility of the government changes according to the chosen demand level. For the
rst pair, the expected utility of the government is
ug(x

1; 0) =  g
For the second pair, the expected utility of the government depending on x is
 2ppgx+ g
which decreases in the demand level. Therefore the expected utility of the govern-
ment in this range has a lower bound in which the demand level is x22
ug(x;
r
px
g
  1jx 2 [x1; x22)) <  g   2ga
Clearly, the second pair gives lower expected utility to the government.
In case of intervention, the government can maximize her expected utility by
choosing the lowest level of violence that causes third-party intervention. In that
case the expected utility of the government from intervention becomes
ug(x; a
; 1) =  xu   ga
The government is never tempted by the intervention if the maximum expected
utility she can get from the intervention is lower than the minimum expected utility
she can derive if she avoids intervention. This condition is satised if
 xu   ga   g   2ga
which forces the following constraint over the third-party division
xu  g + ga
This condition ensures that there is a SPNE in which the third-party does not
intervene to the conict for this case. If the condition is not satised, then the
government can deviate to a and cause intervention since it is more benecial for
herself.
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3.3: Analysis
If both conditions for xu are satised, the game has multiple SPNE in which the
third-party does not intervene and has no SPNE with intervention. As mentioned
earlier, conditions on third-party division correspond to the underlying assumption
in the literature and lead government to prefer bilateral war over intervention. If
this condition is satised, the government never implements a level of violence that
can generate third-party intervention even if the demand level of the region elite
is very high. Since the government knows the true value of intervention threshold,
she is not manipulated by the region elite in case of complete information. In that
regard, the model is compatible with Cetinyan (2002) whose study suggests that the
possibility of intervention does not necessarily contributes to violence but it changes
the terms of the agreement or the stakes at bargaining. If the government never
yields intervention, then she never resorts to brutal violence.
The third-party division can be considered as a punishment for the brutal vi-
olence the government has implemented and if the standard of this punishment
is high, then the government never implements brutal violence against the region
elite. In order to prevent governments from resorting to extreme violence, inter-
national community must make credible threats to the government who intends to
implement brutal violence in order to suppress the rebellion. The conditions on xu
ensures that the punishment is high enough for government to avoid intervention in
any circumstances.
If the conditions on xu is not satised, there is a SPNE in which the government
chooses a in response to certain demand level and the third-party intervenes. This
equilibrium implies that, if the punishment to the government is not high enough,
she can prefer intervention to bilateral war for some instances and stick with the
level of violence that generates intervention.
In the next chapter, we look at information asymmetries and the e¤ects of the
possibility of intervention on the dynamics of the conict between the region elite
and the government.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INTERVENTION MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMA-
TION
4.1: The Model
In case of incomplete information, both the region elite and the government lack
certain information over the war cost of the third-party. The extensive form game
is represented in Figure 4.1 by adding the decision of the nature before the decision
node of the third-party. Since both parties do not know the cost of the third-party,
they do not know the true value of intervention threshold as well. The threshold a
is assumed to be uniformly distributed over [0; 1] for simplicity. At the boundaries,
the decision of the third-party is certain: it does not intervene in the minimum level
of violence and it certainly intervenes if the level of violence gets to its maximum.
We solve the model by backward induction while keeping the true value of a
unknown for the region elite and government. Since a is uniformly distributed
in [0; 1], every level of violence generates a probability equal to itself for the true
threshold to be lower than the chosen level. So, if the government chooses the
level of violence as a, it means that third-party will intervene to the conict with
probability of a. Both region elite and the government adjust their expected payo¤s
accordingly.
At t = 3, the third-party decides whether to intervene or not into the conict
and the decision depends on the true value of parameter c and function v. As it was
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: Figure 4.1: The Intervention Model with Incomplete Information
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in the complete information, best response of the third-party is as follows
Bt(x; a) =
8><>:
 = 0 if a < a
 = 1 if a > a
 = f0; 1g if a = a
Since the region elite and the government do not know the true value of c and
a, they make their decision according to their belief about a. Since a is uniformly
distributed in [0; 1], every level of violence generates a probability equal to itself for
the true threshold to be lower than the chosen level. So, if the government chooses
the level of violence as a, it means that third-party will intervene to the conict
with probability of a. Both region elite and the government adjust their expected
payo¤s accordingly.
At t = 2, the government chooses a level of violence ag, and faces an intervention
with probability ag, and does not face any intervention with probability 1   ag.
When the expected utility of the government is written accordingly, she tries to
maximize the following objective function:
max
a
(1  a)(  p
1 + a
x  ga) + a( xu   ga)
which is a concave function and maximized at
a(x) =   1
g + xu

g + xu  
p
2
p
px (g + xu)

The optimal level of violence depends on x and can take values from the interior
of the strategy set of the government if the demand level falls in a certain range.
When the demand level is out of this range, the level of violence takes values at
the boundaries. Therefore, the optimal choice of the government at this node is the
following
a(x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if x  g + xu
2p
= x1
1 if
 
x  x  2(g + xu)
p
= x2
  1
g + xu

g + xu  
p
2
p
px (g + xu)

if x1 < x < x

2
The optimal level of violence gets 0 when the demand level is equal to x1 and for
every demand below this demand level, the government responds with solely political
means by choosing the minimum level of violence and faces a zero probability for
the intervention. Demand levels in this range are not high enough for government to
oppose in a way that increases the probability of intervention. Similarly, the optimal
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level of violence becomes 1 when the demand level is equal to x2 and for every
demand above this level, the government chooses the maximum level of violence
and intervention becomes certain.
Once the decision of the government is determined, we look at the decision of
the region elite in order to nd the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game.
At t = 1, the region elite has a similar objective function since the probability of
intervention is determined by the level of violence the government chooses. There-
fore, the region elite can expect an intervention from the third-party by probability
ag. Hence, its objective function is as following
max
x
(1  a(x))( p
1 + a(x)
x  ra) + a(x)(xu   ra(x))
Above we found the best response of the government according to demand level
chosen by the region elite. Therefore, we will look at three cases in which the region
elite nds out the demand level that maximizes the expected utility in that range.
Next step, would be comparing these utilities and choose the one that gives the
highest benet.
Case 1 x 2 [0; x1]
In order to make the government to choose zero level of violence the demand must
be between 0 and x1. For such a demand level, the government chooses the minimum
level of violence and both parties know that there will not be an intervention for
sure. In that case the objective function reaches its maximum value at x = x1. The
utility driven from these choices is
uR(x

1; 0; 0) =
g + xu
2
Case 2 x 2 [x2;
 
x]
In order to make the government to choose the maximum level of violence, the
demand must be higher than x2. When the government chooses the maximum level
of violence, the intervention is certain and the payo¤ of the region elite is the same
for every demand level since she gets the third-party division while su¤ering the war
cost from the level of violence. Formally, the utility of the region elite in this case is
uR(x 2 [x2;
 
x]; 1; 1) = xu   r
Therefore all x 2 [x2;
 
x] is and optimal action for the region elite.
Case 3 x 2 [x1; x2]
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For the next range, a demand level between x1 and x

2 makes the government to
choose
a(x) =   1
g + xu

g + xu  
p
2
p
px (g + xu)

In that case, the objective function of the region elite reaches its maximum point at
x =
1
p (g + xu)

1
2
p
2g   1
2
p
2r +
p
2xu
2
The utility driven from these choices is
uR(x
; a(x); ) =
1
2 (g + xu)
 
g2 + 2gxu + r
2   2rxu + 2x2u

When we compare the utilities of the region elite in di¤erent cases, the utility
driven from the last case is higher than other cases. Therefore the region elite makes
a demand equal to x and the government responds respectively with a(x). The
third-party decides whether to intervene or not according to the level of violence.
The choices of the region elite, the government and the third-party driven from
the equilibrium found by backward induction are as follows:
x =
1
p (g + xu)

1
2
p
2g   1
2
p
2r +
p
2xu
2
a(x) =   1
g + xu

g + xu  
p
2
p
px (g + xu)

=
xu   r
xu + g
 =
8><>:
1 if a(x) > a
0 a(x) < a
f0; 1g if a(x) = a
4.2: Analysisand Comparative Studies
The equilibrium of the three-player model with incomplete information generates
several implications. Throughout the analysis, we give numerical examples and some
comparative analysis for each implication and then put forward the general case as
a proposition. In these numerical examples, we look at the a¤ect of a change in a
parameter to the choices of the region elite and the government. Therefore, each
example except the rst one includes three parameters with assumed values and a
relationship between another parameter and a choice.
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Proposition 1 In the equilibrium, both region elite and the government are not
certain about the intervention decision of the third-party.
In order to have certain information over the intervention decision, the level
of violence within the conict must be at the boundaries; minimum level for no
intervention and maximum level for intervention. In the equilibrium the level of
violence chosen by the government becomes
ag =
xu   r
xu + g
The third-party division is assumed to be higher than the cost parameter of the
region elite, as explained previously; and all parameters above are higher than zero.
Therefore, the equilibrium level of violence is never at the boundaries of [0; 1].
The government chooses boundary levels only if the demand of the region elite
does not fall into the set (x1; x

2). However, the region elite never maximizes its
expected utility in these ranges, therefore the level of violence does not get its
minimum and maximum values. Therefore, both parties have to act according to
expectations about the intervention derived from the distribution of the intervention
threshold.
Next, in a numerical example we will look at how the government responds to
a change in the demand o¤ the region elite. In this example, we assume that the
third-party division xu = 1:5, the probability of the region elite to be successful in a
conict without any violence p = 0:5, cost parameter of the government g = 0:3 and
cost parameter of region elite r = 0:4. With these values, the relationship between
the demand level and the level of violence is as follows:
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1.2
demand level
level of violence
Figure 4.2: An increase in the demand increases the level of violence
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The graph above represents a positive relationship between two variables, in-
dicating that the level of violence increases with the demand level. For assumed
parameters, the government chooses the minimum level of violence if the demand
is less than or equal to 1:8, and chooses the maximum level of violence if the de-
mand is higher than or equal to 7:2. Between these two values, the level of violence
increases as the region elite increases her demand. As the demand from the region
elite increases, the expected utility of the government decreases if the probability
of winning the war stays the same. Therefore, the government increases the level
of violence by some degree in order to respond to that decrease even though it in-
creases the war cost related with the level of violence and the probability of getting
an intervention from the third-party.
Proposition 2 The region elite can manipulate the government to choose higher
levels of violence by increasing the demand level at rst stage.
This can be seen from the derivative of the level of violence in respect to the
demand level
d
dx
(ag(x)) =
1
2
p
2
pp
px (g + xu)
> 0
The positive derivative for the inner solution indicates that the government responds
to higher demands with higher levels of violence. In the equilibrium the region elite
never makes a demand high enough for government to choose the maximum level of
violence, yet the government seems to have the courage to respond in that way if
the demand ever reaches above a certain threshold. With a su¢ ciently high amount
of demand, the government might prefer to have an intervention.
The proposition has another implication which argues that the region elite can
determine the likelihood of the intervention. The third-party decides to intervene
according to the level of violence within the conict and this proposition implies
that the region elite can manipulate the government in order to increase the level
of violence. The information asymmetry over the intervention threshold prevents
the region elite from ensuring the intervention. However its action may generate a
higher level of violence, so higher probability of intervention into the conict.
Next, we analyze the relationship between the actions of the parties and their
respective cost parameters. Higher cost parameter for a party means higher disu-
tility for each level of violence. Therefore, both region elite and the government
avoid higher levels of violence within the conict. The government can choose lower
levels directly and region elite can decrease the demand level and manipulates the
government to decrease the level of violence. Assumed values are xu = 1:5, p = 0:5,
g = 0:3 for Figure 4.3 and xu = 1:5, p = 0:5, r = 0:4.for Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: An increase in the region cost parameter increases the demand level
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Figure 4.4: An increase in government cost parameter decreases the level of
violence
Proposition 3 and 4 generalizes the example.
Proposition 3 The demand level of the region elite decreases when the cost para-
meter of the region elite increases.
As mentioned previously, the relation between the demand and the war cost is
built upon the level of violence. When the cost parameter increases, the region elite
decreases the demand level so that the government does not resort to high levels
of violence. The proposition can be justied by the derivative of demand level in
equilibrium with respect to cost parameter.
d
dr
(x) =   1
p (g + xu)
(g   r + 2xu) < 0
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Proposition 4 The level of violence decreases when the war cost parameter of the
government increases.
The government war cost, on the other hand, inuences the level of violence
directly. In order to avoid from higher cost, the government must decrease the level
of violence. The relationship can be seen from the derivative of the level of violence
in the equilibrium with respect to the government cost parameter.
d
dg
(ag) =
1
(g + xu)
2 (r   xu) < 0
Now we will look at how the change in the cost parameter of one party a¤ects
the decision of the other. Figure 4.5 represents the relationship between the cost
parameter of the government and the demand level from the region elite. For this
analysis we assume xu = 1:5, p = 0:5, r = 0:4. It is clear that, the region elite
responds to higher cost parameters for the government with higher demand.
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Figure 4.5: An increase in government cost parameter increases the demand
Proposition 5 The demand level is positively a¤ected by the cost parameter of the
government.
The idea of this proposition is following: As the cost parameter of the government
increases, the government needs to bear higher cost for every level of violence. This
encourages the region elite to make higher demands relying on the fact that the
government is not in a position to increase the level of violence easily since she has
to su¤er from higher cost for each level of increase in the violence. The positive
relationship can be seen through the derivative of the demand level in equilibrium
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with respect to cost parameter of the government.
d
dg
(x) =
1
2p (g + xu)
2 (g + r) (g   r + 2xu) > 0
Similar analysis can be done with the cost parameter analysis of the region elite
and the level of violence chosen by the government. We assume same values for
xu and p and r = 0:4. Figure 4.6, represents a negative relationship between two,
implying that the level of violence within the conict decreases if the cost parameter
of the region elite increases.
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Figure 4.6: An increase in region cost parameter decreases the level of violence
Proposition 6 The level of violence is negatively a¤ected by the cost parameter of
the region elite.
When the cost parameter of the region elite is higher, it makes a lower demand
according to Proposition 3. In that case, the government chooses a lower level of
violence as shown in Proposition 2. By this decision, the expected utility of the
government in case of no intervention increases while the probability of intervention
decreases. In this way, the government gets higher utility with higher probability.
The relationship can be seen from the derivative of the expected utility of the gov-
ernment in case of no intervention and the level of violence in the equilibrium with
respect to cost parameter of the region elite.
d
dr
(ug(x
; ag(x); )) =
1
2 (g + xu)
 
(g   r + 2xu)2
3
2
(3g + xu) (g   r + 2xu)3 > 0
d
dr
(ag) =  
1
g + xu
< 0
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Last proposition will examine the e¤ect of the third-party division on the dy-
namics of the conict. In the model, if the third-party decides to intervene, she
rearranges the status-quo outcome and gives some of the resources the government
had to the region elite. Third-party uses this division, xu, as a punishment to the
government in case of brutal violence or as a threat in order to prevent the govern-
ment from acting brutally. In that regard, higher xu means higher punishment for
the government in case of intervention and is hoped to decrease the level of violence
within the conict. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 imply the opposite.
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Figure 4.7: An increase in third-party division increases the demand
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Figure 4.8: An increase in third-party division increases the level of violence
Proposition 7 Both the demand level of the region and the level of violence chosen
by the government increases as the third-party division favors the region elite more;
creating a moral hazard situation for the third-party.
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As the third-party increases the share of the region elite after the intervention, xu,
the elite nds itself in a situation in which its expected payo¤ from the intervention
increases. As a result the intervention becomes more benecial in the sense that
the extra share from the intervention exceeds the potential cost by the increase of
violence from the government. Therefore, they increase the demand in order to
increase their payo¤ in case of no intervention. At this point the region elite is
not uncomfortable with the government to increase the level of violence since more
brutal violence can lead them to the intervention. Another case might arise if the
payo¤ the region elite gets from the intervention is higher than the payo¤ from
bilateral conict. In such a situation the region elite might prefer the intervention
and manipulate the government to increase the level of violence so that the third-
party intervenes to the conict.
The government increases the level of violence when the region elite demands
more as a consequence of the change in the third-party division by taking the risk
of intervention. If the intervention threshold is too high, the government can still
avoid it by increasing the level of violence in a moderate way. However, in this way
she certainly balances her expected gain from the bilateral conict by increasing the
probability of winning in response to higher lose if the region elite wins the conict.
At that point the government takes the risk of intervention and responds to increase
in demand with more brutal violence.
As a result, more promises to the party that su¤ers from the violence and more
serious sanctions to the executor generates higher levels of violence within the con-
ict in contrast to what was aimed. In this kind of an environment, the action
of the third-party to make a thread of intervention in order to prevent brutal vi-
olence generates more violence. More importantly, this situation is a result of the
response of the region elite who accepts brutal violence from the government al-
though the third-party acts in order to protect the minority in the rst place. The
model clearly foresees a moral hazard situation when the intervention threshold is
unknown to both the region elite and the government. In that regard, the model
is convenient with the thoughts of those who point out such a danger in case of
humanitarian intervention.
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CHAPTER 5
KOSOVO WAR: A CASE STUDY
The Kosovo war was the last one of the deadly wars which broke out with the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. Following the death of Tito, Kosovo was among the
ones who got autonomous governance as part of the reformation process of the
republic in 1980s. For a decade, Kosovo Albanians enjoyed this autonomy as the
Serb superiority within state o¢ ces ceased and the proportion of Albanians in the
population increased steadily. However, Albanian authority over the territory of
Kosovo began to depreciate as Milosevic gained more and more power rst in the
Communist Party and then as a Serbian Nationalist leader. In 1989, Milosevic
established reforms that necessitates using Serbo-Croatian language in public o¢ ces
and causes the removal of Albanians from o¢ ces. Some were immediately red and
some others were forced to resign since they did not give an oath for loyalty to
Serbia. (Kuperman, 2008b)
The Albanian response to these changes was peaceful for a decade. Ibrahim
Rugova and his party Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) embraced a low-tension
behavior and passive resistance against the Serbian aggressiveness. Meanwhile Milo-
sevic was not considering Kosovo as a primary issue during the wars with Croatians
and Bosnians. Besides, Albanians were successfully unarmed during the disunica-
tion of the Yugoslav army and did not have enough power to resist Serbian authority
(Grigorian, 2005). In such an environment, launching an armed rebellion seemed
meaningless to Rugova who explained the situation in 1992:
We ... know that [the Serbian military presence] is overwhelming and
that we have nothing to set against the tanks and other modern weaponry
in Serbian hands. We would have no chance of successfully resisting the
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army. In fact the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian
population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and
stay alive than to be massacred. (Vickers, 1998; as cited in Judah, 2000,
p.61)
Judah explains that this policy of the Kosovo Albanians had three important
considerations back then: staying alive by not giving any reason to Serbs for eth-
nic cleansing, keeping the issue on international agenda and building a legitimacy
for the Republic of Kosovo (p.74). This policy continued until the Dayton Peace
Agreement between Serbia and new Bosnian Republic in 1995 as a result of NATOs
enforcement of Serbian leaders. For many Kosovo Albanians, the agreement proved
that the peaceful policy followed by Rugova was not appreciated by Western powers
while Bosnians got an independent state as a result of genocidal retaliation by Serbs
and Western intervention at last Following the Dayton Agreement, the full-scale
UN embargo on Yugoslavia lifted and EU recognized Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
including Kosovo territories.(p.125). Western powers seemed to ignore the Kosovo
issue and this ignorance made many Albanians to consider other strategies. Veton
Surroi, a Kosovo Albanian political leader, explains the feelings of Kosovo Albani-
ans: "There is a message that is being sent to the Kosovars - if you want to draw
international attention you have to ght for it. That is exactly it. You need to use
violence to achieve your goals." (Little, 2000)
The nancial scandal of 1997 in Albania which created a chaotic environment
for gun transfers to Kosovo Albanians helped a less-supported organization to gain
power while people questioned the peaceful policy of Rugova and the LDK. The
armed campaign of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) grew into a full-scale in-
surgency by 1997. The assassination of Serbian policemen by KLA militias on 25
February 1998 was responded with massive use of violence by Serbia. The negotia-
tions between Albanians and Serbians under the patronage of Contact Group were
ceased by Rugova since the Serbian forces did not cease violence during the nego-
tiations. In 1999 NATO forces threatened Milosevic with a sustained bombing if
he did not surrender Kosovo their sovereignty for an interim period which will end
with a referendum for the future of the region. Milosevic rejected the ultimatum and
continued the violence against the Albanians. On 24th of March NATO launched
an air strike against Serbia lasting 11 weeks which forced Milosevic to cease the vio-
lence at the end (Grigorian 2005, p.201). After a year of reconstructing the country
and the state bureaucracy, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and
Western the powers were among the rst ones who recognize the independence of
the Kosovo.
The issue of moral hazard in the case of Kosovo is related with the actions of
KLA and its competition with the peaceful LDK under Ibrahim Rugova. When
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KLA began its attacks on Serbia, the situation Rugova described in 1992 had not
changed at all. Serbian forces were still much stronger than KLA militia forces
and the Bosnian war had showed that they would not hesitate to resort genocidal
violence in case of an upraise. While Rugova tried to maintain a relevant peace,
why did KLA started an armed conict which would end up with extreme violence
and probable defeat? Miscalculation of the response from Serbia is not a good
answer after what happened in Bosnia and KLA Leader Hashim Thaci also admits
that they were aware of the result of armed violence would be retaliation by Serbia
against civilians (Little, 2000). In his interview with Kuperman, Emrush Xhemajli,
cofounder of KLA, states that "We thought it was essential to get international
support to win the war. You could not stand against the world. We thought that
with the international community on our side, we could win the war. But otherwise
we would plan for a 10- to 15-year war, with a strategy to get the international
community on our side." (Kuperman, 2008b, p.69).
The chronological events in the Kosovo war; the rise of KLA at the expense of
peaceful LDK after the Dayton Peace Agreement indicates a moral hazard problem
in Kosovo. The interviews implies that KLA leaders risked the lives of many civilians
with armed rebellion even though they could estimate the response of the Serbian
army by looking at its actions in Bosnia war. They also accepted that they relied
upon the third-party intervention since the capability of the KLA was not enough
to defeat Serbian forces. At the end, the brutal violence implemented by Serbians
caused a NATO intervention and Kosovo is declared to be an independent state in
the following years.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The three-player model we propose discusses the dynamics of a conict between
a government and a minority group when there is a possibility of third-party in-
tervention. The region elite representing the minority makes a demand and the
government chooses a level of violence to respond to this demand in order to stay
in status-quo. Existence of a third-party implies a threat to the government so that
she does not resort to full brutal violence in order to suppress the region elite. The
third-party division can be considered as a punishment to the government in case of
brutal violence and is intended to discourage the government from such a behavior.
In that regard, the third-party can change the division in favor of the region elite
in order to decrease the expected payo¤ of the government in case of intervention
so that the government never resorts to level of violence that is higher than the
intervention threshold and the region elite does not su¤er from brutal violence.
However, the equilibrium implies a moral hazard problem, since as the third-
party division favors region elite more, the elite better manipulates the government
to have a higher level of violence within the conict so that the intervention guaran-
tees a certain change from the status-quo in favor of the region elite. In that case,
justication of the humanitarian intervention in order to prevent populations from
brutal violence results in a situation in which the region elite accepts su¤ering from
such a violence in order to get higher benets at the end with the help of third-party
intervention.
The threat of third-party intervention and the moral hazard issue related with
this threat are examined earlier within the extended-deterrence theory and by other
authors. However, in those studies, the interest of the third-party is derived from
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its direct benet from the stakes of war. In most studies, the payo¤ of the third-
party is highly correlated with the share the region elite gets from the resources.
In our study, on the other hand, the expected utility of the third-party is a¤ected
by the cost it must bear in case of intervention and the level of violence within the
conict. In that regard, the intervention decision depends on solely humanitarian
reasons, since the third-party intervenes only if the level of violence within the
conict reaches a certain point that cannot be tolerated anymore. All humanitarian
interventions are criticized by some degree with the idea that the intervener might
have some secret agenda or expected political gains in her mind. However, the model
implies that even if the intervener does not have any interest in the conict other
than the intention of decreasing the level of violence; the intervention can generate
undesirable results. The results of the model, therefore, are important to consider;
since they indicate that the international community should look for other measures
in order to prevent populations from brutal violence.
Ruling out humanitarian intervention in order to avoid a moral hazard prob-
lem might leave populations without any insurance to state violence and result in
even greater levels of violence around the globe. Moreover, protecting civilians in
a conict is considered as a duty for the international community as a part of the
responsibility to support and protect human rights whenever necessary. As Ko
Annan, back then the Secretary-General, states in 54th session of UN General As-
sembly:
... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to
gross and systematic violations of human rights that o¤end every precept
of our common humanity? (ICISS, p.2)
Therefore, instead of discussing the necessity of the humanitarian intervention,
one should look for ways to increase its e¤ectiveness and to make it robust to manip-
ulations from the conict. A point in which the risk of moral hazard is minimized
without increasing the risk of populations to be faced with brutal violence should
be found in order to satisfy the main intention behind the intervention.
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